This Article, the original version of which was published in the Minnesota Law Review (vol. 91,, studies the construction of third party copyright liability after the recent Supreme Court case Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd. This inquiry is important because third party copyright liability has become a controversial area of law that affects the viability of entire industries. Unfortunately, the law governing third party copyright liability is unclear. Grokster involved a claim of third party liability against defendants whose technology supported the sharing of music over the Internet, and it represents the Supreme Court's attempt to bring coherence to the relevant law.
such inducement by the defendants to make summary judgment inappropriate, 21 and remanded the case for further consideration. 22 Grokster is not a simple case. Initially it appears to complicate matters by endorsing inducement without explicitly resolving the conflicts in existing law. However, careful analysis of the conflicting theories that animate copyright liability shows that Grokster created an improved framework for future construction of third-party copyright liability. 23 Courts consistently state that the doctrines of third-party copyright liability arose from common law tort. 24 It therefore comes as no surprise that the most important theories of tort-fault and strict liability-shed considerable light on the construction of third-party copyright liability. 25 For example, third-party copyright liability could be a matter of fault. If so, liability exists because a defendant's behavior is culpable or socially costly. 26 Alternatively, the same area of law might involve strict liability. If so, liability exists because it encourages defendants to stop others from infringing and to raise compensation for victims of infringement. 27 Reference to tort clarifies the conflicting choices made by courts before Grokster. Some courts adopted a limited approach to third-party copyright liability because they were sensitive to its disadvantages. 28 These courts generally preferred faultbased constructions of the law because determinations of fault often include a sophisticated balancing of social costs and benefits. 29 This approach made it possible to protect innocent defendants from bearing responsibility for the misdeeds of others while limiting liability to situations where the benefits outweighed the costs. By contrast, other courts expansively applied third-party copyright liability because they considered the prevention of infringement paramount. 30 These courts frequently adopted strict liability constructions of the law because they saw little need to balance the social costs and benefits of liability. They also expansively interpreted the law to prevent cynical, faulty defendants from exploiting doctrinal ambiguity to escape liability, even if this meant exposing innocent defendants to unwarranted liability. 31 Grokster addressed these conflicting choices in two ways. First, Justice Souter's opinion of the Court referred repeatedly to concepts of fault, justifying inducement on the ground that those who want to cause infringement are culpable. 32 Indeed, the Court's preference for fault was so strong that it subtly restated the formulation for vicarious liability to exclude strict liability. 33 This established fault as the dominant theory of third-party copyright liability and cast doubt on strict liability interpretations of the law. Second, Grokster's adoption of inducement greatly reduced the justification for expansively interpreting pre-Grokster doctrines of third-party copyright liability. As noted earlier, expansive liability ensures that culpable defendants do not escape liability, but it also risks holding innocent defendants liable for the behavior of others and suppressing non-infringing behavior. This article will show that inducement gives courts a new tool for holding culpable defendants liable while reducing the risk of undesirable side effects. 34 Future courts should therefore apply pre-Grokster doctrines cautiously to minimize those undesirable side effects while judiciously using inducement to make sure that the most culpable defendants face liability.
The article proceeds in five parts. Part I describes the doctrines that governed third-party copyright liability before Grokster. This description shows that courts generally interpreted those doctrines within fairly well-articulated limits, and that a few courts disregarded these limits in order to apply third-party copyright liability expansively. Part II uses fault and strict liability to expose the theoretical Third-party copyright liability after Grokster 235 and practical tradeoffs implicit in these differing constructions of the law. Next, Part III analyzes the Grokster case and its use of fault to explain third-party copyright liability. Part IV describes the implications of Grokster's reliance on fault and sets forth the general contours of an improved, post-Grokster construction of third-party copyright liability. The article concludes in Part V with some thoughts about the future of third-party copyright liability.
I. Third-party copyright liability before Grokster Two causes of action derived from tort-contributory copyright liability and vicarious copyright liability-governed pre-Grokster third-party copyright liability. Courts developed these doctrines along two distinct lines. Most adopted a relatively limited interpretation of the law, imposing third-party copyright liability only on defendants who had close relationships with primary infringers. A smaller number of courts applied third-party copyright liability more expansively, imposing liability on a wide range of defendants, including those who had relatively remote relationships with copyright infringers. This section surveys the relevant case law.
I.A The limited interpretation of contributory liability and vicarious liability
Contributory copyright liability. Courts routinely cite Gershwin Publishing Corp. vs. Columbia Artists Management, Inc. for the proposition that 'one who, with knowledge of the infringing activity, induces, causes or materially contributes to the infringing conduct of another, may be held liable as a ''contributory'' infringer'. 35 This definition includes the word 'induces'-a term carrying great significance after Grokster. However, the leading elaborations of contributory liability before Grokster did not analyze the meaning of inducement. They described instead the type of knowledge and material contribution required to establish liability. 36 The intuition expressed by contributory liability is simple. If a person knows that another is committing copyright infringement, it is arguably wrong for that person to assist the infringer. That intuition does not, however, define the level of knowledge or assistance necessary to create legal liability for another's infringement, for different types of knowledge and assistance imply very different results. Consider first a defendant who sells custom-length blank cassette tapes to a person he knows will use the tapes to make unauthorized copies of copyrighted music for sale to the public. 37 This seller is quite culpable because he knows exactly who commits the infringement, understands the nature of the infringement and provides assistance that directly supports the infringement. By contrast, consider a defendant who processes credit card transactions despite learning that certain unidentified customers take credit cards in payment for the sale of infringing goods. 38 This defendant is less culpable than the seller of blank tapes because her knowledge of identity is less specific and her support is less directly related to infringement. Accordingly, the scope of contributory copyright liability depends on whether liability requires fairly specific knowledge and direct assistance, or whether general knowledge and indirect assistance will suffice. Courts differ in their answers to this question, but a majority of them require relatively specific knowledge and direct assistance. 39 This limited approach to contributory liability starts with the Gershwin case. 40 The Gershwin defendant was Columbia Artists Management, a company that managed concert artists and created opportunities for them to perform. 41 Columbia sometimes created performance opportunities by organizing local community performance associations who would in turn sponsor annual concert series for which Columbia could book its performers. 42 Columbia provided regular assistance to these local associations. 43 It also contacted its artists to get the titles of the works being performed and printed programs for each performance. 44 Unfortunately, many of these performances took place without appropriate copyright licenses, and a number of copyright holders sued Columbia. 45 The district court held Columbia liable on theories of contributory and vicarious liability, and the Second Circuit affirmed. 46 On the whole, Columbia was a rather culpable defendant. It knew the specific identities of the infringers, the works being infringed and the dates on which infringement would happen. 47 Moreover, Columbia supported this infringement by organizing the entities that sponsored infringing concerts and providing logistical assistance. 48 Accordingly, Gershwin is consistent with the proposition that liability exists only when the defendant has fairly specific knowledge of infringement and offers direct assistance.
The Supreme Court reinforced the limited interpretation of contributory liability in Sony Corp. of America vs. Universal City Studios, Inc., 49 in which the plaintiffs held copyright in a number of works broadcast for television viewing and copied by individuals using videotape recorders (VCRs) made and sold by Sony. 50 The claim against Sony was simple. Sony knew that some of the people who bought VCRs would use them to commit infringement, and yet it assisted them by selling VCRs. 51 The Ninth Circuit agreed with this argument and held Sony liable. 52 The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Sony did not have the type of knowledge necessary to support infringement. 53 In so doing, the Court worried that broad third-party copyright liability would harm the public interest by deterring productive, legitimate behavior. 54 Copyright therefore had to 'strike a balance between a copyright holder's legitimate demand for effective-not merely symbolic-protection of the statutory monopoly, and the rights of others freely to engage in substantially unrelated areas of commerce'. 55 The Court rejected the Ninth Circuit's finding that Sony had actual knowledge of infringement, stating that constructive knowledge offered the only plausible method for supporting Sony's liability. 56 In theory, Sony's knowledge about its customers' use of VCRs might have established constructive knowledge, but the Court held that such knowledge could not exist as long as VCRs were 'capable of substantial noninfringing uses'. 57 The Court concluded that VCRs were indeed capable of substantial non-infringing uses and decided the case in Sony's favor. 58 The implications of Sony are significant. Sony clearly knew ('actually knew', in the colloquial sense) that some users of VCRs would commit infringement. 59 Sony therefore supports the proposition that a defendant cannot be held liable merely because it knows that others will use something the defendant sells to commit copyright infringement. Something more is needed. The thing being sold must be incapable of substantial non-infringing use, or the defendant must have more specific knowledge about infringement, perhaps by knowing the precise identity of the infringer and the works being infringed. 60 For example, in A&M Records, Inc. vs. Abdallah, the defendant sold 'time-loaded' cassette tapes. 61 Such tapes are ordinary blank cassettes that have been loaded with an amount of tape designed to run for a particular time. 62 Legitimate producers of recorded music use them to reproduce music programming of nonstandard length. 63 To illustrate, if 26 minutes of programming are duplicated on a standard 30-minute cassette, Third-party copyright liability after Grokster 237 listeners would be inconvenienced by long periods of silence at the end of the tape. 64 A cassette with precisely 26 minutes of tape is far more desirable. 65 Abdallah sold time-loaded cassettes to specific individuals, knowing they used the tapes to produce counterfeit recordings of popular music. 66 In some cases, Abdallah timed the length of legitimate tapes slated for counterfeiting in order to determine the type of cassette needed. 67 Abdallah claimed that Sony shielded him from contributory liability because blank time-loaded cassette tapes are capable of substantial non-infringing use. 68 Abdallah was correct in his characterization of such tapes, for legitimate producers of music frequently use them. 69 However, the court rejected Abdallah's use of Sony because he knew exactly to whom he was selling the tapes and the precise nature of the buyers' behavior. 70 Moreover, Abdallah's assistance went beyond the mere sale of blank tapes. 71 He even financed his customers after a police raid. 72 Therefore, Abdallah's direct assistance, coupled with his specific knowledge of his customers' infringing activities, justified the district court's imposition of contributory infringement. 73
The limited interpretation of vicarious copyright liability. Courts have also adopted limited interpretations of vicarious liability. Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. vs. H.L. Green Co. provides the modern definition of the doctrine. 74 In Shapiro, the Jalen Amusement Company made counterfeit recordings of a number of songs in which the plaintiffs held copyright. 75 Jalen, the concessionaire who operated the record department in stores owned by the defendant H.L. Green Co., sold the counterfeit recordings in Green's stores. 76 Green's relationship with its concessionaire was fairly close. 77 Jalen had operated Green's record department for 13 years, 78 Jalen and its employees were obligated to follow Green's rules and regulations, and Green had the authority to discharge Jalen's employees. 79 Daily receipts from the sale of records went into Green's cash registers, and Green's cashiers took custody of the money. 80 Green then deducted its 10 -12% commission, the salaries of Jalen's employees, and taxes before giving the balance to Jalen. 81 Customers who purchased records from Jalen received receipts from Green with no mention of Jalen. 82 The plaintiffs sued Green, contending that it was liable for Jalen's infringement, but the district court found for Green. 83 The Second Circuit reversed. 84 In so doing, the court understood that Jalen was not technically Green's employee. 85 Nevertheless, the court believed that the policies supporting respondeat superior would be well served by holding Green liable. 86 The court wrote:
When the right and ability to supervise coalesce with an obvious and direct financial interest in the exploitation of copyrighted materialseven in the absence of actual knowledge that the copyright monopoly is being impaired-the purposes of copyright law may be best effectuated by the imposition of liability upon the beneficiary of that exploitation. 87
In the case at hand, Green had considerable control over Jalen's behavior through Green's ability to dictate policy and employment, operate its stores and control financial receipts. 88 Green's percentage commission also gave it a direct financial interest in Jalen's infringement. 89 Accordingly, the court appropriately held Green vicariously liable. 90 Shapiro implied that vicarious copyright liability requires a fairly high level of control over and immediately direct financial interest in another's infringement.
On the issue of control, Green had a great deal of power over Jalen, particularly with respect to the conduct of Jalen's employees, their payment and the handling of revenue raised from record sales. 91 Such power exceeded the simple ability to influence whether infringement occurred. It bordered on the active, day-to-day management of the underlying infringer's business. Similarly, with respect to financial interest, Green took a percentage of every infringing record sale. 92 Jalen's infringement led directly to money in Green's coffers. That is why the Second Circuit used Green's 'obvious and direct financial interest' in Jalen's infringement to justify liability. 93 The result presumably would have been different if Green had had only an obscure and indirect financial interest in Jalen's behavior.
Many courts have followed this interpretation of Shapiro. For example, in Banff Ltd. vs. Limited, Inc., the Southern District of New York considered the claim that the defendant was liable for infringement committed by its corporate subsidiary. 94 The court recognized that it could have interpreted Shapiro's language to impose liability on the defendant because a corporate parent legally controls its subsidiaries and benefits from the subsidiaries' profits. 95 However, the court feared that this interpretation would hold every parent liable for the infringing acts of its subsidiaries. 96 Such a result would improperly expand copyright's reach, so the court interpreted Shapiro narrowly. The court stated that the formal relationship between two parties did not control the existence of vicarious liability. 97 Liability could exist only if the parties' paths 'cross[ed] on a daily basis, and the character of this intersection must be such that the party against whom liability is sought is in a position to control the personnel and activities responsible for the direct infringement'. 98 Similarly, in Artists Music Inc. vs. Reed Publishing (USA) Inc., the defendant organized a trade show at which it rented booths to various exhibitors. 99 The plaintiffs alleged that some of those exhibitors performed some of the plaintiffs' copyrighted music without licenses. 100 The plaintiffs sued, claiming that Reed was vicariously liable for the infringing performances. 101 Both parties moved for summary judgment, and the court decided in favor of Reed. 102 The court's rejection of the plaintiffs' arguments clearly expressed a limited vision of vicarious liability. The defendant unquestionably had some ability to control whether infringement occurred because it could have prohibited the use of music by exhibitors or monitored such use. The plaintiffs contended that this ability established a right and ability to supervise, 103 but the court rejected this argument, citing Shapiro. 104 The plaintiffs also argued that the defendant had a financial interest in the underlying infringements because music made the exhibits more attractive, thereby increasing the show's paid attendance and the defendant's revenue. 105 The court rejected this interest as insufficient 106 -a conclusion that made sense given the obvious distinction between the direct generation of cash receipts through infringement in Shapiro and the secondary, indirect economic effects identified by the Artists Music plaintiffs. 107
I.B. The expansive interpretation of contributory and vicarious copyright liability
The limited interpretation of third-party copyright liability was a well-established part of pre-Grokster law for it was consistent with the seminal cases in the field and endorsed by the Supreme Court in Sony. However, a few courts interpreted the law differently. Their opinions expanded third-party copyright liability, making it Third-party copyright liability after Grokster 239 significantly easier to hold defendants liable for the misconduct of others. Fonovisa, Inc. vs. Cherry Auction, Inc. 108 is the leading case adopting an expansive interpretation of third-party copyright liability. The defendants operated the Cherry Auction swap meet, which rented booth space to vendors for a daily fee. 109 Cherry Auction knew that a number of these vendors sold counterfeit music tapes. 110 The Fresno County Sheriff raided Cherry Auction's swap meet in 1991, seizing over 38,000 counterfeit recordings and making 27 arrests. 111 In 1992, the Sheriff sent a letter to Cherry Auction stating that vendors continued to sell counterfeit recordings and that Cherry Auction had agreed to provide the Sheriff with identifying information about the infringers. 112 The plaintiff's own investigator also observed infringement at the swap meet by over 50% of the vendors. 113 Despite such knowledge, Cherry Auction continued to operate the swap meet and rent space to infringers, and it never gathered the information it had agreed to provide the Sheriff. 114 In fact, the defendants apparently created two categories of spaces for rent, reserving one for those who preferred not to provide identification. 115 This behavior allowed the majority of infringers to rent in relative anonymity. 116 The plaintiffs sued on theories of contributory and vicarious liability. 117 The case against the Fonovisa defendants was questionable under the limited interpretation of third-party copyright liability. With respect to contributory liability, the Fonovisa defendants knew less about and did less to help infringement than did the Shapiro or Abdallah defendants. Those operating the Cherry Auction only knew that infringement took place at the swap meet, but they did not know the precise identities of the miscreants or the works infringed. 118 Renting booths to infringers facilitated the sale of infringing goods, but the Fonovisa defendants did not organize infringing entities or print programs for infringing performances, nor did the Fonovisa defendants measure the time of music being copied or finance infringers. 119 With respect to vicarious liability, Cherry Auction did not control its vendors the way Green controlled Jalen in Shapiro, nor did Cherry Auction derive revenue from each infringing sale. 120 The district court recognized this and dismissed the plaintiff's complaint, citing Gershwin and Shapiro as support. 121 The plaintiff appealed, and the Ninth Circuit reversed. 122 The Ninth Circuit's interpretation of third-party copyright liability clearly differed from the limited interpretation this article has already described. The court held that Fonovisa alleged sufficient knowledge to support contributory liability even though the defendants lacked the specific knowledge found in Gershwin and Abdallah. 123 Additionally, the court weakened contributory liability's requirement of material contribution by endorsing the idea that simply providing the means to infringe creates contributory liability. 124 Fonovisa did even more to expand vicarious liability. In Shapiro, the defendant Green had the ability to fire Jalen's employees, collected Jalen's cash receipts, paid Jalen's taxes and issued paychecks on Jalen's behalf. 125 The Fonovisa defendants could do none of these things. Nevertheless, the court found that the defendants had sufficient control because they could terminate vendors who committed infringement. 126 With respect to financial benefit, the Ninth Circuit was equally generous. Under Shapiro, vicarious liability could not exist unless the defendant had a direct financial interest in the underlying infringement. 127 Green had a direct financial interest because it took a percentage of each infringing sale by Jalen. 128 By contrast, the Fonovisa defendants had a much less direct interest in infringement because they did not share the revenues of infringers who rented swap meet booths. 129 This distinction did not impress the Fonovisa court for it considered an indirect financial benefit alone sufficient to support vicarious liability. 130 This interpretation of the law directly contradicted the requirement of direct financial interest found in Shapiro and many other cases, and it was crucial to the court's decision in the plaintiffs' favor. 131 Fonovisa is not the only case to apply third-party copyright liability expansively. 132 Indeed, this approach has become sufficiently common to suggest that a remote business relationship with an infringer is enough to create thirdparty liability. 133 For example, in Perfect 10, Inc. vs. Cybernet Ventures, Inc., the plaintiff held copyrights in a number of pornographic images distributed via its magazine and website. 134 To Perfect 10's dismay, some competitor websites displayed infringing copies of Perfect 10 images. 135 Presumably, Perfect 10 could have sued each of these websites for copyright infringement, but it chose instead to sue Cybernet Ventures, a company that ran an age verification service (AVS) called Adult Check. 136 Adult Check's primary function was to verify the ages of viewers who wished to see the pornographic images on a number of independent websites voluntarily choosing to use the Adult Check service. 137 A new viewer who visited an affiliated website received the opportunity to purchase a password to a number of affiliated websites through Cybernet, who in turn charged the viewer a fee via credit card and verified the viewer's age, using the credit card as a proxy for age. 138 Cybernet also offered different tiers of password membership, with viewers who paid higher fees gaining access to 'higher-quality' websites. 139 Cybernet reviewed the various websites in its network for the quality of its images, monitored compliance with its policies and shared the fees it collected with affiliated websites that referred customers. 140 Perfect 10 moved for a preliminary injunction that, among other things, would have required Cybernet to enforce Perfect 10's copyright interests against affiliated websites. 141 The limited approach to third-party copyright liability casts doubt on Perfect 10's suit against Cybernet. Granted, Cybernet arguably marketed a number of websites and worked to create a uniform appearance and brand, but those activities do not necessarily establish the elements of a third-party copyright claim. With respect to contributory liability, Cybernet's knowledge seemed too general because many of the complaints it received were 'generic'. 142 Additionally, it is hard to see how processing membership payments and password systems contributed directly to infringement. These payments may have provided economic support to infringing websites, but that does not rise to the level of arranging infringing performances for one's own clients or providing blank tapes for use by known counterfeiters. For vicarious liability, it seems difficult to conclude that Cybernet could control the underlying infringement as each individual website was responsible for its own content and servers. 143 Moreover, Cybernet's revenue did not come directly from infringement in the same way that Green's revenue came from Jalen's. Considering these facts under the usual standard that preliminary injunctions are issued only when the plaintiff shows a strong likelihood of success on the merits, 144 Perfect 10's chances for success would seem slim.
Nevertheless, the Perfect 10 court granted the desired preliminary injunction, relying heavily on Fonovisa to create an interpretation of third-party copyright liability that comfortably supported its decision. The court began by adopting Fonovisa's expansive view of contributory liability, concluding that Cybernet's general level of knowledge was comparable to Cherry Auction's. 145 Next, the Third-party copyright liability after Grokster 241 court cited Fonovisa for the proposition that general support for an infringer's business, as opposed to direct support of infringement, satisfies the requirement of material contribution. 146 The court made similar use of Fonovisa to support its findings about vicarious liability. Remember that Fonovisa found a relatively indirect financial interest in infringement sufficient to support vicarious liability. 147 Cybernet therefore could not escape liability simply because it did not take a share of any profits raised from infringement. 148 To the contrary, Cybernet had the necessary financial interest because the availability of infringing images attracted people to websites where they were encouraged to purchase age verification services. 149 Finally, the court cited Fonovisa in concluding that Cybernet's ability to terminate infringers from its membership program and control customer access through passwords established the control necessary to support vicarious liability. 150 Motorvations Inc. vs. M&M Inc. offers yet another example of the expansive interpretation of third-party copyright liability. 151 The plaintiff specialized in designing advertisements for car dealerships. 152 James Whipple, who was also in the advertising business, copied Motorvations' prior work in order to promote a car sale event for Motorvations' former client, Larry H. Miller Chrysler/Plymouth (Miller). 153 Motorvations sued Whipple for copyright infringement and Miller for vicarious and contributory infringement. 154 In addition, Motorvations sued Karl Malone Toyota (Malone), who joined the event that Whipple was promoting, but did not deal directly with Whipple. 155 The court rejected the contributory copyright claims at summary judgment, but held that Miller and Malone were vicariously liable. 156 The Motorvations approach to vicarious liability is expansive, especially when one keeps in mind the facts of cases like Shapiro. Neither defendant supervised Whipple to the extent that Green supervised Jalen, nor did Miller or Malone receive revenue directly from the infringement. 157 Indeed, Malone had no direct dealings with Whipple. 158 Nevertheless, the court held Miller and Malone liable at summary judgment. 159 The court understood that Miller and Malone had relatively distant relations with Whipple, but it feared the consequences of failing to hold them liable. Miller and Malone might be innocent, but other defendants would take advantage of the law's leniency by turning a 'blind eye' to infringement. 160 The court therefore preferred to hold Miller and Malone liable to ensure liability against all irresponsible parties. The court accomplished this objective by holding that Miller and Malone's mere ability to reject the advertising established sufficient control, and that the defendants had a direct financial interest in creation of Whipple's advertisement. 161 A simple hypothetical demonstrates how cases like Fonovisa, Perfect 10 and Motorvations greatly expand the scope of third-party copyright liability. 162 Imagine an aggressive copyright holder who wants to hold the electric company responsible for copyright infringement. His argument is simple. A lot less infringement would occur if the electric company would stop selling electricity to infringers because infringers need electricity to access the Internet, burn CDs or use their computers. To this end, he discovers the names and addresses of various infringers and sends a complaining letter to the electric company. He claims that if the electric company does not turn off the power to the identified infringers, he will sue. This hypothesized claim is deliberately farfetched. The Supreme Court's Sony decision would surely rule out contributory liability based on constructive knowledge derived from awareness that people use electricity to commit infringement because electricity is capable of substantial non-infringing uses such as running refrigerators and illuminating light bulbs. 163 To the extent that the argument for contributory liability might rest on actual knowledge of specific individuals committing infringement, the electric company would still not be liable because it is not substantially involved in infringement. 164 Finally, vicarious liability would not exist because the electric company does not dictate who commits infringement, and its financial interest is remote. 165 However, the expansive interpretation endorsed by Fonovisa makes the opposite result plausible. The electric company can control whether infringement occurs by turning off the power. Additionally, the electric company has at least an indirect interest in the underlying infringement because infringing behavior increases the demand for electricity. Given Fonovisa's view that the ability to exclude someone from a swap meet and the ancillary effect of infringement on concession sales is enough to establish vicarious liability, 166 the electric company's vicarious liability is no longer farfetched. Fonovisa similarly affects the analysis of the electric company's contributory liability. 167 Knowledge arguably exists because our hypothetical plaintiff sent letters identifying infringers to the electric company. 168 Moreover, infringers could never commit the infringement without electricity. Hence the electric company offers the same kind of, if not stronger, support to infringers as Cherry Auction. 169
II. Tradeoffs in the construction of third-party copyright liability
Fonovisa and its progeny meant that the pre-Grokster law of third-party copyright liability contained two divergent lines of cases. The first line applied liability relatively narrowly, limiting liability to defendants who are closely involved with infringement committed by others. The second line took a much broader approach, expanding liability to defendants whose goods or services support infringement indirectly or occasionally. The inconsistency of pre-Grokster law raises the question of why courts would interpret the same doctrines so differently. Answering this question is not easy and requires exploration of the theory and practical consequences of third-party copyright liability. This exploration shows that courts have adopted different interpretations of thirdparty copyright liability because they disagree about tradeoffs implicit in constructing the law. Courts agree that third-party copyright liability is a descendant of common law tort, 170 and tort law offers two theories that motivate third-party copyright liability. Such liability could exist because a defendant's faulty behavior caused someone else to infringe. Alternatively, it could exist because, at least in some situations, defendants are strictly liable for infringement committed by others.
Fault and strict liability explain third-party copyright liability in different ways. Courts use fault to identify defendants who deserve to be held liable. Fault generally means that the defendant intended to injure the victim or failed to take reasonable precautions against the possibility of the victim's injury. 171 Faulty defendants deserve to be held liable because they have done something wrong and are culpably responsible for the victim's injury. 172 This explanation implies that third-party copyright liability exists to hold defendants responsible for the consequences of unreasonably supporting infringement. By contrast, courts impose strict liability in tort with relatively little regard for whether defendants have behaved unreasonably. Instead, the objective is to make defendants prevent Third-party copyright liability after Grokster 243 injuries and raise compensation for tort victims, 173 which suggests that third-party copyright liability exists to deter infringement and ensure compensation for any infringement that occurs.
Strict liability and fault identify important social benefits associated with thirdparty copyright liability. It is good for society to discourage infringement, raise compensation and hold unreasonable actors liable for the consequences of their behavior. However, it is important to recognize the undesirable side effects that accompany pursuit of these worthy goals. Consider the potential third-party copyright liability of Internet service providers (ISPs). ISPs support infringement, but they also support a great deal of legitimate, non-infringing behavior such as email, web surfing and shopping. If society adopted a blanket rule that ISPs must always pay for infringement committed by their subscribers, ISPs would respond by stopping some infringement and paying for the rest. Society would benefit because copyrights would be more secure, but at least two potentially undesirable consequences would follow.
First, such broad liability would certainly fall on ISPs that do not deserve liability because their behavior is reasonable. As an extreme example, an ISP might comprehensively monitor its subscribers and suspend all who are suspected of infringement. Such an ISP would stop a great deal of infringement, but sooner or later a mistake would be made and infringement would occur. It is unfair to hold such an ISP liable because the precautions it took against infringement seem more than reasonable. The culpability that might otherwise justify liability simply does not exist. Second, such broad liability would create social losses by suppressing valuable non-infringing behavior. Some ISPs may respond to blanket liability by going out of business, thereby causing the loss of all the non-infringing behavior the ISP previously supported. If an ISP chose to stay in business, it would sometimes mistakenly identify a subscriber's behavior as infringing and deny service to a non-infringer. Even if the ISP simply chose to pay for its subscribers' infringement, it would likely do so by levying a fee on all of its subscribers, including those who do not commit infringement. These non-infringing subscribers would have to pay more for Internet service, and subscribers at the margin would ultimately forego the use of the Internet and its benefits.
This analysis shows that courts must balance the advantages and disadvantages of third-party copyright liability. Striking this balance requires as much art as science. As an initial matter, some of the relevant costs and benefits seem incommensurable. It may be possible to put a dollar value on copyright security, but the injustice of imposing liability on a defendant who has behaved reasonably defies simple monetization. Moreover, some of the considerations that are theoretically quantifiable will prove elusive to measure. There may be a theoretical dollar value for the non-infringing behavior that is suppressed as third-party copyright liability expands. However, the ways in which those losses occur are so diverse that an accurate measurement seems unlikely and certainly beyond the means of courts. Courts must therefore make sensitive, almost philosophical, judgments about the social importance of deterring infringement, compensating victims and holding the culpable liable, and they must do likewise for the social costs of exposing reasonable, innocent defendants to liability and suppressing legitimate, non-infringing behavior. Only then can they decide whether the pursuit of admirable objectives justifies the collateral losses that inevitably follow.
Judges disagree about the interpretation and scope of third-party copyright liability because they have different opinions on the theory and practical implementation of the law. The relevant pattern of disagreement emerges by recognizing that vicarious copyright liability is a form of strict liability, while contributory liability is a form of fault-based liability that resembles negligence. Vicarious copyright liability is strict because courts impose it without regard to the reasonableness of the defendant's behavior. Such liability exists when the defendant has 'the right and ability to supervise' an infringer and 'an obvious and direct financial interest' in the infringement. 174 If vicarious copyright liability were based on fault, then defendants would be able to escape liability by taking reasonable precautions that excuse them from liability for any infringement that happens to occur. 175 However, the elements of vicarious liability obviate that possibility because precautions taken by the defendant do not affect the defendant's control over or financial interest in any underlying infringement. In short, vicarious liability exists as long as a defendant has the necessary relationship with an infringer. 176 Contributory liability is a form of fault-based liability because it mimics tort law's inquiry into a defendant's potential negligence. Standard tort law imposes on defendants the duty to behave as a reasonable person in the same or similar circumstances. 177 When courts evaluate whether a defendant is negligent, they determine what the defendant knew or reasonably should have known about the consequences associated with his behavior and whether they acted reasonably in light of those consequences. 178 Contributory liability depends on the defendant's knowledge of and material contribution to the infringement of another. 179 These elements amount to asking what a defendant knew or reasonably should have known about another's infringement and whether they behaved reasonably in light of that knowledge. 180 Liability is a matter of fault because defendants can escape liability by refusing to provide material contribution to known infringersa form of behaving reasonably in light of what they know.
The foregoing shows that vicarious and contributory liability affect third-party copyright liability very differently. Contributory liability's reliance on fault implies that it meaningfully limits the scope of third-party copyright liability. In tort, fault imposes liability only on culpable defendants who deserve to be held liable because they have intentionally or negligently injured others. Accordingly, the mere fact that a defendant could have taken precautions against a plaintiff's injury does not, in and of itself, justify liability. Something more is requirednamely a finding that the defendant's behavior was unreasonable with respect to the plaintiff. 181 Fault significantly limits third-party copyright liability because many individuals who might limit or stop infringing behavior are not unreasonable for having failed to do so. For example, landlords certainly support infringement because some of their renters will commit infringement, and landlords could take precautions to reduce it. However, simply renting property is not unreasonable behavior. Accordingly, a court applying fault principles ordinarily would not hold landlords liable for infringement committed by tenants. 182 By contrast, vicarious liability expands third-party copyright liability because the former is strict. As noted earlier, courts impose strict liability in tort because it deters tortious conduct and raises compensation for victims. 183 Strict liability broadens third-party copyright liability because its rationale applies to almost any defendant who has influence over infringement by others. After all, such a defendant could use her influence to stop or reduce infringement, so liability will force her to do so or raise money to pay for it. Accordingly, a court applying strict Third-party copyright liability after Grokster 245 liability might hold almost any defendant liable in order to encourage precaution against infringement and ensure the payment of compensation to copyright holders. 184 The relationship between the theories and doctrines of third-party copyright liability makes it possible to identify how judicial attitudes towards the advantages and disadvantages of such liability emerge in the theoretical and doctrinal choices this article has described. On the one hand, some courts think that the advantages of third-party copyright liability are modest, especially when compared to the risks of exposing innocent defendants to liability and suppressing non-infringing behavior. These courts prefer fault-inspired constructions of the law because fault is sensitive to the problems associated with third-party copyright liability. Accordingly, they limit the application of vicarious liability to a relatively narrow range of facts and interpret contributory liability with considerable regard for the defendant's possible innocence and the legitimate noninfringing activities the defendant supports. Two cases discussed earlier, Sony Corp. of America vs. Universal City Studios 185 and Banff Ltd. vs. Limited, Inc., 186 illustrate this perfectly. In Sony, the Supreme Court refused to entertain seriously the possibility of vicarious liability, 187 and went on to find in Sony's favor precisely because it worried that the losses associated with third-party copyright liability outweighed any gains. 188 In Banff, Judge Haight understood the 'serious implications in greatly expanding the reach of the Copyright Act', 189 and refused to hold a parent corporation vicariously liable for the infringement of its subsidiary. 190 On the other hand, some courts have great confidence in the benefits of thirdparty copyright liability and worry very little about the associated losses. These courts are comfortable with the consequences of strict liability, and they gravitate toward the expansive application of vicarious and contributory liability with relatively little concern for the consequences that may follow. Fonovisa, Inc. vs. Cherry Auction, Inc. 191 vividly exemplifies this reasoning. Remember that the Fonovisa defendants had a good case under a limited interpretation of third-party copyright liability, and the district court dismissed the plaintiffs' complaint on that basis. 192 The Ninth Circuit's reversal therefore required expansive interpretations of both vicarious and contributory liability. 193 A telling combination of theory and factual circumstance made this possible.
With respect to vicarious liability, the court adopted a clear strict liability rationale that embraced third-party liability as valuable without considering the potential negative consequences. 194 The court approvingly cited Polygram International Publishing, Inc. vs. Nevada/TIG, Inc., a case in which the District of Massachusetts considered a suit for vicarious copyright liability against the operator of a trade show for the unlicensed use of music by some of the show's exhibitors. 195 These facts were similar to those of Artists Music Inc. vs. Reed Publishing(USA) Inc., 196 which was discussed earlier as an example of limited vicarious liability. The reader will recall that the Artists Music court did not believe that a trade show operator had enough control over or financial interest in an exhibitor's infringement to justify liability. 197 The Polygram court reached exactly the opposite conclusion, adopting a strict liability theory of the case:
Modern decisions, when explaining policy justifications for vicarious liability rather than merely citing precedent, commonly refer to risk allocation. When an individual seeks to profit from an enterprise in which identifiable types of losses are expected to occur, it is ordinarily fair and reasonable to place responsibility for those losses on the person who profits, even if that person makes arrangements for others to perform the acts that foreseeably cause the losses. The law of vicarious liability treats the expected losses as simply another cost of doing business. The enterprise and the person profiting from it are better able than either the innocent injured plaintiff or the person whose act caused the loss to distribute the costs and to shift them to others who have profited from the enterprise. In addition, placing responsibility for the loss on the enterprise has the added benefit of creating a greater incentive for the enterprise to police its operations carefully to avoid unnecessary losses. 198 This led the court to the consciously broad interpretation of vicarious liability the Fonovisa court later adopted.
With respect to contributory liability, the Fonovisa court concentrated on facts that made the defendants seem culpably responsible for assisting infringement. Among other things, the defendants knew that a number of their renters committed infringement because of the raid conducted by the sheriff and the complaints received from the plaintiff. 199 They promised to help the sheriff identify infringers, but never followed through. 200 In fact, they appear to have facilitated hiding the infringers' identity by creating a class of booths that could be rented anonymously. 201 These facts show that the defendants were not innocent, accidental supporters of infringement. To the contrary, they cynically calculated that infringement was good for their business and took deliberate steps for the purpose of perpetuating infringement. The defendants wanted infringement to occur, and they wanted to capitalize on it for business purposes. In short, leaving aside questions of law, the defendants were culpable and deserved to be held liable.
The Ninth Circuit must have been outraged by the idea that such cynically culpable defendants could escape liability for operating a business that profited so openly from infringement. The injustice of the district court's decision probably convinced the Ninth Circuit that a great deal of good would come from holding the defendants liable-enough good to overcome any undesirable consequences associated with an expansion of third-party copyright liability's scope. Accordingly, the court expanded the scope of contributory copyright liability to make sure that culpable actors would be held responsible for infringement they supported, but it simultaneously opened the door to overbroad liability that threatens innocent actors while imposing more social costs than benefits. 202 In short, courts failed to give the pre-Grokster law of third-party copyright liability a coherent structure for two reasons: they could not agree about the advantages and disadvantages of such liability; and they had not resolved whether such liability is primarily a matter of fault or strict liability. Improvement in the law therefore required a framework that clearly delineates the relative roles of fault and strict liability, while taking a stance on the relative importance of the advantages and disadvantages associated with third-party copyright liability. This background explains why Grokster became an important case. Many anticipated that the Supreme Court would use Grokster to clarify the law by definitively choosing one interpretation clearly identifying the parameters of third-party copyright liability. As will be discussed below, the Court did not do Third-party copyright liability after Grokster 247 this as directly as some might have hoped. It did, however, discuss third-party copyright liability in a manner that promotes a more coherent and effective structure for the law.
III. Grokster
Grokster was the third of three closely followed cases about the liability of peerto-peer technology providers. 203 In all three cases, the plaintiffs held copyright in various works that were traded over peer-to-peer networks created by the defendants, and the plaintiffs claimed that the defendants were vicariously and contributorily liable for making infringement over those networks possible. Decisions in the first two of the cases favored the plaintiffs, 204 but the Ninth Circuit granted summary judgment to the Grokster defendants. 205 The Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed. 206 The Supreme Court could have decided Grokster for either party because each side had support from one branch of pre-Grokster law. For example, the Court could have applied liability expansively under Fonovisa and its progeny. Vicarious liability would have existed because the Grokster defendants had at least some control over their users' infringement 207 and made peer-to-peer technology available to infringers in the hope of eventually turning a profit through advertising revenue. 208 Contributory liability would have been found because the defendants created their networks despite knowing that many people would use the networks for infringement. 209 The Court could just as easily have used Sony to deny liability under a limited interpretation of third-party copyright liability. The Sony Corporation knew that many individuals committed infringement with VCRs and still sold the technology that made infringement possible. 210 However, the Supreme Court refused to hold Sony liable. 211 As an initial matter, the generalized knowledge that some individuals used VCRs to commit infringement did not establish Sony's actual knowledge of infringement. Sony's liability therefore depended on the imputation of constructive knowledge to them. 212 However, the Court held the imputation of such knowledge inappropriate because VCRs were capable of 'substantial non-infringing uses'. 213 Application of this logic would have excused the Grokster defendants from liability. After all, the defendants' networks supported more than infringing behavior. The district court found that users traded public domain files as well as copyrighted files with the permission of copyright holders. Such activity comprised a distinct minority of network activity, but it was sufficient for the district court and the Ninth Circuit to characterize the non-infringing uses as 'substantial'. 214 The Supreme Court therefore had the chance to establish Sony's control over cases like Grokster, or to limit Sony's application in favor of reasoning like Fonovisa's.
Grokster was a tricky case for the Supreme Court because it embodied the problematic tradeoffs that already plagued the law. Application of Sony would have had the laudable effect of protecting innocent defendants from liability and avoiding any chill on non-infringing behavior. However, it also would have jeopardized the cases of copyright holders against cynical and unethical defendants who wanted to exploit Sony's pro-defendant standard. Almost every technology that supports copyright infringement can also be used for noninfringing purposes. Unethical and cynical individuals would then claim that they could support and profit from infringement by citing our hypothesized Grokster decision for the proposition that a very small percentage of legitimate use was enough to shield a technology provider from third-party copyright liability, no matter what.
The most obvious 'solution' to this problem would have been an interpretation of Sony that allowed courts to more easily hold defendants liable. Such an intellectual maneuver would have been similar to the one made by the Fonovisa court, and the Court could have accomplished it either by holding the defendants vicariously liable or by adopting the plaintiffs' argument for contributory liability against distributors of technology 'principally' used for infringement. 215 Such an interpretation of Sony would indeed have stopped the unethical and cynical from evading liability. Unfortunately, it would also have exposed many innocent technology providers to liability simply because others use their technology to infringe, and it easily could have discouraged people from creating valuable technology, thereby harming the public interest. 216 The Court chose not to follow either branch of pre-Grokster law, opting instead to endorse a new, third branch of third-party copyright liability. This left Sony's sensitivity about the negative consequences of such liability intact while creating a new cause of action to protect copyrights. The Court began with a perceptive and nuanced understanding of contributory liability. Before Grokster, the overwhelming majority of cases analyzed such liability under a single rubric that depended on the elements of knowledge and material contribution. 217 Justice Souter correctly recognized that these elements worked by measuring the culpable fault of a defendant. 218 Justice Souter's explicit reference to fault made it possible to explain the logic of Sony in a way that would protect innocent technology providers from suit while imposing liability on unethical and cynical distributors of technology.
The Court began by reviewing Sony's logic and its relationship to patent law's staple article of commerce doctrine. The Court wrote:
In sum, where an article is 'good for nothing else' but infringement, there is no legitimate public interest in its unlicensed availability, and there is no injustice in presuming or imputing an intent to infringe. Conversely, the doctrine absolves the equivocal conduct of selling an item with substantial lawful as well as unlawful uses, and limits liability to instances of more acute fault than the mere understanding that some of one's products will be misused. 219 This passage demonstrates the Court's concern for separating innocent technology providers whose users happen to commit infringement from those whose behavior is so culpable that liability is justified. Moreover, the Court clearly did not consider a defendant sufficiently culpable simply for knowing that its technology could be used to infringe. A 'more acute fault' was required. 220 This requirement made the plaintiffs' suggested interpretation of Sony unsatisfactory because it would impose liability on too many innocent defendants.
It was equally clear, however, that the Court was not going to allow Sony to shield all distributors of technology simply because people might use the technology legally. The Court understood that the culpability of a technology provider depends on the provider's intent as well as the technology's characteristics. It is one thing to distribute technology that could be used to infringe in the hope that others will use it legitimately. It is something else to Third-party copyright liability after Grokster 249 distribute the same technology in the hope that others will use it to infringe. The court wrote:
Sony's rule limits imputing culpable intent as a matter of law from the characteristics or uses of a distributed product. But nothing in Sony requires courts to ignore evidence of intent if there is such evidence, and the case was never meant to foreclose rules of fault-based liability derived from the common law. Thus, where evidence goes beyond a product's characteristics or the knowledge that it may be put to infringing uses, and shows statements or actions directed to promoting infringement, Sony's staple-article rule will not preclude liability. 221 The Grokster Court's use of fault created two different ways of analyzing the third-party copyright liability of technology providers. The first approach identifies fault from the characteristics and uses of technology distributed by the defendant, and it is limited by Sony. A defendant who distributes technology presumably knows what its technology does and how it might be used. If the technology is used for infringing purposes, the defendant's knowledge of such use provides a plausible basis for labeling the defendant's behavior faulty. However, Sony limits the imposition of such liability to cases where the defendant's technology is not capable of substantial non-infringing use because a more permissive regime of liability would expose too many innocent defendants to liability. 222 The second approach identifies fault from evidence of the defendant's deliberate inducement of infringement and is not limited by Sony. 223 Someone who advertises use of a particular technology for infringement or instructs users on how to commit infringement is culpable if infringement results. Moreover, that culpability does not depend on the characteristics of the technology in question. The defendant would be equally culpable if the technology in question has many or very few non-infringing uses because the defendant's culpability arises from his specific desire to cause infringement. Accordingly, Sony does not affect the third-party copyright liability of defendants who intentionally induce infringement. 224 The identification of two distinct analyses for third-party copyright liability profoundly affected the outcome of Grokster. If liability could be derived only from characteristics of the defendants' technology, the defendants would presumably have escaped liability because the district court found that the technology was capable of substantial non-infringing use. However, the possibility of liability based on the defendants' intentional inducement opened the door to holding the defendants liable despite those non-infringing uses. The Court drew particular attention to evidence suggesting that the Grokster defendants wanted their users to infringe. Among other things, the defendants tried to attract users of other peer-topeer file-sharing programs that were widely used to infringe, 225 encouraged users to infringe 226 and planned to capitalize on infringement they knew would occur. 227 The Court went on to find that the Ninth Circuit had failed to consider evidence of the defendants' intent to cause infringement, vacated and remanded for further consideration. 228 
IV. The construction of third-party copyright liability after Grokster
It may seem on first inspection that Grokster has done nothing to improve the construction of third-party copyright liability and may have confused things even more. The case left behind three distinct causes of action for third-party copyright liability. If courts could not agree about the proper interpretation of the two doctrines that existed before Grokster, they should have even more trouble agreeing about vicarious liability, contributory liability and inducement. This reaction to Grokster is wrong. In reality, it laid the groundwork for constructive change in the law by emphasizing fault, and not strict liability, as the primary theory of third-party copyright liability. This emphasis on fault discredited the expansive application of third-party copyright liability found in Fonovisa and its progeny. It further implied that the limited application of contributory liability and inducement should become the backbone of the law, with a smaller role reserved for vicarious liability.
IV.A. The primacy of fault as a theory of third-party copyright liability
Grokster sent a strong signal that the Supreme Court considers fault the primary theory of third-party copyright liability. Note that the Court could have easily reversed the Ninth Circuit by adopting a strict liability theory of the case. Such a decision would have been consistent with the imposition of vicarious liability, and it would have sent a strong message that security of copyright mattered more to the Court than a defendant's innocence or the suppression of non-infringing behavior. Of course, the Court chose not to do this, preferring instead to explain its decision with a new cause of action based on fault. 229 This implied that the Justices were uncomfortable with strict liability and preferred a fault theory of the case because fault offered a better framework for balancing the advantages and disadvantages of third-party copyright liability.
The initial conceptualization of Grokster illustrates the Court's commitment to fault. The Court recognized that third-party copyright liability has its costs and that balancing is crucial to proper construction of the law. 230 The Court knew that the case for liability against the defendants was strong, yet it eschewed strict liability in favor of fault. In fact, the Court's commitment to fault was so strong that it changed the rationale of vicarious liability from strict liability to fault. Justice Souter wrote: 'One infringes contributorily by intentionally inducing or encouraging direct infringement, and infringes vicariously by profiting from direct infringement while declining to exercise a right to stop or limit it.' 231 At first inspection, this sentence looks like a routine statement of the basic elements for third-party copyright liability. The language feels like boilerplate, and the Court cites to the seminal cases defining those elements: Gershwin and Shapiro. 232 However, closer examination reveals that something more significant is going on. The reference to Gershwin was generally accurate, and it obviously foreshadowed the Court's later adoption of inducement. 233 However, the reference to Shapiro introduced an important change. Shapiro stated that:
When the right and ability to supervise coalesce with an obvious and direct financial interest in the exploitation of copyrighted materialseven in the absence of actual knowledge that the copyright monopoly is being impaired-the purposes of copyright law may be best effectuated by the imposition of liability upon the beneficiary of that exploitation. 234 This is a clear statement of strict liability. A defendant with the appropriate relationship to an infringer is liable for any infringement that occurs, no matter Third-party copyright liability after Grokster 251 what. The defendant can exercise all the control that she has over the infringer in an effort to stop infringement, but this will not excuse her liability. By contrast, Grokster's statement of vicarious liability allows the defendant to escape liability by exercising control. The Court stated that a defendant 'infringes vicariously by profiting from direct infringement while declining to exercise a right to stop or limit it'. 235 No longer does a defendant face liability even if she exercises control. To the contrary, she escapes liability if she exercises whatever control she has, even if she fails to stop the infringement. This means that a defendant is not at fault if she takes reasonable precaution against the possibility of harm to the plaintiff-a result that is theoretically consistent with the Court's later assertion that those who induce infringement deserve to be held liable. 236 
IV.B. The consequences of fault
Grokster's reliance on fault points the way to an improved, more coherent construction of third-party copyright liability. Remember that judicial disagreement about fault and strict liability contributed a great deal to the inconsistencies of pre-Grokster law. Grokster settled this disagreement by clearly turning away from the strict liability rationale that supported Polygram 237 and Fonovisa. 238 This preference for fault created a framework that will govern the future interpretation of vicarious liability, contributory liability and inducement in copyright. First, and most importantly, courts should limit vicarious liability to a relatively narrow range of facts. Expansive application of such liability of the sort found in Fonovisa and Motorvations 239 would make perfect sense if strict liability were the primary rationale governing third-party copyright liability. However, Grokster made strict liability a secondary justification for such liability. Future courts should therefore restrict the application of vicarious copyright liability, perhaps to the general contours of respondeat superior, in order to avoid contradicting Grokster's reliance on fault. 240 Second, courts should cautiously apply contributory liability to make sure that the doctrine does not turn into a form of strict liability. As was noted earlier, courts sometimes interpret the elements of knowledge and material contribution quite expansively. This is precisely what happened in Fonovisa and its progeny. The result technically may not be strict liability, but the effect is quite similar because innocent defendants face a real risk of liability. 241 If concern about the negative consequences of third-party copyright liability casts doubt on the expansive interpretation of vicarious liability, it should do likewise for the expansive interpretation of contributory liability. Courts should therefore eschew interpretations drawn from cases like Fonovisa in favor of those drawn from Sony precisely because the latter takes careful account of a defendant's potential innocence and the unintended negative social consequences of third-party copyright liability.
Third and finally, courts must vigilantly limit the scope of inducement to keep that doctrine from destroying the rationale behind fault-based third-party copyright liability. Such vigilance is necessary because plaintiffs will surely urge courts to apply inducement broadly. After all, Sony does not apply to inducement actions, so courts can hold defendants liable as inducers without explicitly considering the undesirable side effects of third-party copyright liability. It therefore makes sense for plaintiffs to sue under inducement whenever possible because doing so would reach many defendants who would not be liable under Sony.
The case for expansively applying inducement starts with the observation that defendants often know that their behavior will make significant infringement possible. If those defendants persist in such behavior, even for reasons unrelated to infringement, they should be held liable because they effectively want the infringement to happen and therefore are culpable. If accepted, this interpretation of inducement might impose liability on manufacturers of CD burners because manufacturers know that people often use those products to make infringing copies of music. The same conclusion might also apply to almost anyone whose behavior regularly supports infringement by others. 242 Careful reflection shows that this interpretation of inducement is superficially attractive, but flawed. As an initial matter, Justice Souter's opinion carefully circumscribes inducement's reach:
[M]ere knowledge of infringing potential or of actual infringing uses would not be enough here to subject a distributor to liability. Nor would ordinary acts incident to product distribution, such as offering customers technical support or product updates, support liability in themselves. The inducement rule, instead, premises liability on purposeful, culpable expression and conduct, and thus does nothing to compromise legitimate commerce or discourage innovation having a lawful promise. 243 Additionally, a broad cause of action for inducement may sound in fault, but it is inconsistent with the fault-based framework created by Grokster. Once again, the common law of tort provides the crucial insight, for inducement and the law of intentional tort both require intentional behavior by the defendant. In tort, courts define intent in two ways. A defendant accused of battery has intent if he acts with the express purpose of causing harmful or offensive contact on the plaintiff's body. 244 Alternatively, intent exists if the defendant merely 'knows with substantial certainty' that his conduct will cause such harmful or offensive contact. 245 This dual definition of intent shows that the suggested broad application of inducement is simply the attempt to apply the second, alternate formulation of intent from tort. The claim is that third-party copyright defendants intentionally induce infringement if they know with substantial certainty that their behavior will lead to infringement. After all, a person who knows that her behavior will surely cause harmful or offensive contact to another 'wants' that contact to happen if she does not change her behavior to stop it. Knowing with substantial certainty therefore makes a defendant culpable in a way that is comparable to a defendant who acts with the express purpose of causing harmful or offensive contact. Accordingly, third-party copyright defendants are as culpable as those who truly want infringement to occur simply because they know that their technologies or services lead to infringement.
The broad interpretation of inducement fails because it rests on an insufficiently nuanced understanding of tort law. The typical 'knowing with substantial certainty' case involves a defendant who has certainty about a single act that exposes the plaintiff to a single instance of potential harm. In the classic case of Garratt vs. Dailey, the defendant was a boy who pulled a chair out from under a plaintiff who was in the process of sitting down. 246 The plaintiff, who fell to the ground and suffered injury, sued for battery. 247 The trial court accepted the defendant's protestation that he did not want the plaintiff to get injured and found for the defendant. 248 However, the Supreme Court of Washington reversed on the ground that the trial court failed to consider whether the defendant knew with Third-party copyright liability after Grokster 253 substantial certainty that the plaintiff would fall to the ground because the defendant had pulled the chair away. 249 By contrast, tort law does not extend liability on the basis of substantial certainty to defendants whose substantial certainty comes from the repetitive creation of risk associated with the widespread manufacture and distribution of products. Consider the sale of automobiles, guns, alcohol and cigarettes. Those who make and sell these things know with substantial certainty that some of their products will eventually injure someone, yet they are not held liable for those injuries as batterers. Liability, if any, exists under doctrines like negligence and products liability. 250 The reasons for this are instructive. People have legitimate reasons for making and selling items like cars, guns, alcohol and cigarettes. If battery were to control tort responsibility for the injuries these products cause, liability would turn on a blunt determination of whether the defendants knew that people would be injured. Manufacturers of widely distributed products always know that injuries are inevitable, so liability would seem certain. However, such a result would be absurd and unfair because the legitimate reasons for making these items sometimes make the associated risk of injury reasonable. Doctrines like negligence and products liability consider the reasonableness of a defendant's behavior in sophisticated ways that battery does not. 251 It is therefore a mistake to determine the liability of manufacturers on the basis of substantial certainty because doing so would supplant the sophisticated balancing analyses of negligence or products liability. 252 Courts understand this, and that is why they reject intentional tort liability in such cases.
For example, in Shaw vs. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., the plaintiff sued a cigarette manufacturer for injuries the plaintiff contended arose from exposure to second-hand smoke. 253 The plaintiff's complaint included claims for negligence and battery. 254 The defendant responded by moving to dismiss all of the plaintiff's claims. 255 The court granted the defendant's motion on battery, but it allowed the plaintiff's claim for negligent failure to warn to proceed. 256 With respect to battery, the plaintiff argued that the manufacturer knew with substantial certainty that second-hand smoke would eventually contact an unwilling person, causing injury. 257 The logic of this claim is similar to the argument that a manufacturer of technology induces infringement because it knows that someone will eventually use the technology for infringement. The Shaw court recognized this logic, and rejected it:
Brown & Williamson did not know with a substantial degree of certainty that second-hand smoke would touch any particular nonsmoker. While it may have had knowledge that second-hand smoke would reach some non-smokers, the Court finds that such generalized knowledge is insufficient to satisfy the intent requirement for battery. Indeed, as defendant points out, a finding that Brown & Williamson has committed a battery by manufacturing cigarettes would be tantamount to holding manufacturers of handguns liable in battery for exposing third parties to gunfire. Such a finding would expose the courts to a flood of farfetched and nebulous litigation concerning the tort of battery. It is unsurprising that neither plaintiffs nor the Court have been able to unearth any case where a manufacturer of cigarettes or handguns was found to have committed a battery against those allegedly injured by its products. 258 This shows why it is important to limit the reach of inducement. If Grokster's inducement is the conceptual analog of an intentional tort, then traditional doctrines shaped by Sony are conceptual analogs of negligence and products liability. Remember that Sony's assessment of non-infringing uses essentially asks whether a defendant's conduct is reasonable. If a technology has sufficient noninfringing uses, then it is reasonable to make and sell it. If those uses are lacking, selling the technology is unreasonable and liability follows.
Courts need to apply inducement narrowly because broad application will destroy the nuanced analysis established by Sony and endorsed in Grokster. Many, if not all, manufacturers of technology stand in positions similar to those occupied by manufacturers of socially valuable products because technology makers know that someone will eventually use their products to infringe. If courts adopt a broad interpretation of inducement, then substantial certainty about the consequence of infringement will be enough to establish third-party copyright liability, even in cases where the defendants make technology with substantial non-infringing uses. Such a result would make no sense because it would destroy our ability to distinguish between culpable defendants who sell technology with no legitimate uses and innocent defendants who sell technology with legitimate uses. These defendants can be separated only if the law is sensitive to the presence of non-infringing uses in cases where defendants do not want infringement to occur. Courts must therefore limit the reach of intentional inducement in order to preserve the nuances associated with the Sony rule, just as they limit the reach of battery to preserve the nuances of negligence and products liability. 259 Supporters of expansive third-party copyright liability will understandably balk at the suggestion made here. In their opinion, cases like Sony are far too lenient on defendants because they leave behind loopholes to be exploited by cynical faulty defendants. Expansive interpretations of third-party copyright liability are therefore necessary, they argue, because those interpretations make it possible to hold all faulty defendants liable. These supporters acknowledge the exposure of innocent defendants to liability and the suppression of non-infringing behavior as unfortunate, but they argue that these consequences are less important than guaranteeing the security of copyright against cynically faulty behavior. It is thus important for courts to follow the lead of cases like Fonovisa and interpret contributory liability and inducement as broadly as possible.
To be sure, the arguments suggested here have some appeal, but Grokster has accounted for them rather well. The argument in favor of expansive liability operates from a concern that cynical defendants will deliberately encourage infringement in hopes of profiting from it. This is exactly what happened in Fonovisa, where the defendants purposefully helped infringers hide their identities in order to protect the rental fees paid by infringers. 260 There is, however, no longer much need to interpret third-party copyright liability expansively to catch these defendants because a properly limited inducement cause of action can do so with a much smaller risk of unfortunate consequences.
Remember that the touchstone of inducement is the deliberate promotion of infringement by others. 261 Inducement will therefore impose liability on many, if not all, of the cynical defendants whose behavior justifies the expansive interpretation of third-party copyright liability, and it will accomplish this task with relatively few unfortunate side effects. Fonovisa's expansive interpretation of contributory liability successfully held cynically faulty defendants liable, but Third-party copyright liability after Grokster 255 it paved the way for claims against all kinds of innocent defendants like ISPs, credit card companies and even the electric company. 262 If the Fonovisa court had applied inducement to its cynical defendants, it would likely have found them liable because the defendants behaved in a manner deliberately calculated to assist infringers. 263 However, the same reasoning would not have exposed ISPs, credit card companies or the electric company to liability because none of them wants infringement to occur. In short, Grokster effectively eliminated the need for expansive interpretations of contributory liability by endorsing inducement-a cause of action that achieves the goals of expansive contributory liability with far fewer undesirable side effects. 264 This answers the concerns of those who argue for the expansive interpretation of third-party copyright liability.
IV.C. The improved construction of third-party copyright liability
It is now possible to summarize the improved construction of third-party copyright liability after Grokster. There are now three causes of action for such liability: vicarious liability, contributory liability and inducement. In the vast majority of cases, the existence of liability depends on a showing that the defendant is at fault. This means that contributory liability and inducement will govern most third-party copyright liability cases, with vicarious liability limited to those cases where agency principles such as respondeat superior would impose strict liability on defendants. Additionally, courts should apply contributory liability and inducement conservatively. In particular, they must avoid interpreting contributory liability in expansive ways that expose innocent defendants to liability and suppress non-infringing behavior. Instead, courts should make sure that the law of contributory liability remains sensitive to the culpability of defendants and the social costs and benefits associated with their behavior. Finally, inducement should be found only when the defendant acts for the express purpose of encouraging infringement. Plaintiffs should not be allowed to recover when a defendant simply knows with substantial certainty that his behavior will support infringement. Such a construction of the law is flawed because it would destroy the sensitive balancing that must occur when the defendant does not deliberately want infringement to occur.
V. Conclusion
This article began with a description of third-party copyright liability before Grokster. It showed that pre-Grokster law had an inconsistent structure that led to significantly divergent interpretations of the law. This divergence made the law incoherent because plaintiffs and defendants alike could never be sure what line of cases the courts would apply. The article then analyzed Grokster and showed that the Supreme Court has made significant choices that imply a limited construction of third-party copyright liability. To be sure, some will not agree about whether the Supreme Court's choices are normatively desirable and will argue for a return to expansive third-party liability. However, the article has shown that the limited approach described here will accomplish many of the objectives that inspire expansive liability with far fewer negative consequences.
Of course, it would be foolish to claim that Grokster has settled all controversies related to third-party copyright liability, and no such claim is made. Even if courts adopt the construction of third-party copyright liability proposed here, many unresolved questions will remain. For example, vicarious liability may have a limited role in third-party copyright liability, but the precise contours of its limits are not clear. The doctrine's origins in respondeat superior suggest that such liability could be limited to employers being sued for infringement committed by their employees; 265 nonetheless, it is conceivable that courts will identify other limits that would not overwhelm the fault-based construction of the law. Similarly, contributory liability may now become the dominant doctrine in third-party copyright liability, but that doctrine does not identify the kinds of behavior that future courts will find unreasonable. Individuals pursuing legitimate objectives inevitably will expose copyright holders to the risk of infringement, and victims of infringement will claim that defendants should have done more to protect copyright. It remains to be seen whether courts will give defendants the duty to thwart infringement affirmatively or whether the honest pursuit of legitimate objectives will be found reasonable. 266 Finally, courts will surely face unknown difficulties when they are asked to begin applying the doctrine of inducement.
All of these challenges are significant, and there will be others as well. Nevertheless, the intellectual foundations provided by Grokster represent a distinct improvement over those available before it. If nothing else, the construction of third-party copyright liability offered here will give courts a coherent framework that encourages courts to approach difficult issues in a cogent, reasonably consistent way. It is this author's hope that decisions made within this framework will, in the long run, benefit society.
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